Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will be happy

to do as you say.

I have submitted the statement for the record, and I will just

cover the major points in summary fashion. I look forward to your

questions and those of your colleagues, because I join all of your

colleagues today, Mr. Chairman, in wishing you all the best in your

retirement——

And expressing the deep appreciation of

our Department, the State Department, for the leadership that you

have given to this Committee.

I think everyone knows that you are one of the last in the House

of Representatives who served in the Pacific during the Second

World War, and so you leave us with a great deal of wisdom and

experience of how we should be acting in East Asia and safeguarding

American interest, and the Congress will lose a lot of wisdom

and experience when you leave as Chairman. So on behalf of

all of my colleagues at the State Department, I want to thank you

for your support for American diplomacy and for the American Foreign

Service. We are very grateful to you.

Mr. Chairman, I will just make a few summary

points, and I look forward to a good discussion.

First, Mr. Chairman, let me state the obvious and say that all

of us were appalled by the reckless behavior of the North Korean

Government over the past 6 months, first, in the missile tests of

July 4 and 5, 2006; second, in the nuclear test of October 9. These

two events clearly speak to the fact that North Korea has violated

its international responsibilities and has threatened its neighbors

and it has threatened global peace and global security.

Our response, the United States’ response, to North Korea’s behavior

has been resolute, and it has been very clear. Together with

China and Japan and Russia, we passed within 5 days of a nuclear

test a very tough UN Security Council resolution, 1718, that imposes

harsh sanctions on the North Koreans; and we are now fully

and, we hope, effectively implementing those sanctions’ resolutions.

I do take note of the number of comments made by Members

here that that is an important piece of business for the United

States to be leading on. We do not and we will not recognize North

Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and thus we seek the full dismantlement

of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. We

want to see North Korea rejoin the nonproliferation treaty and return

to IAEA safeguards; and we believe that the best way to pursue

that objective—the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—

is to pursue a dual-track strategy.

The first of those tracks is pressure and isolation, and that comes

through the UN Security Council sanctions and the actions of leading

countries like the United States. The second of those tracks is

to keep the door open to discussions and a return to the Six-Party

Talks, and we are pursuing both of those tracks with purpose and

with energy.

I think you know that President Bush and Secretary Rice are in

Asia. They will soon be arriving in Hanoi, and part of their visits

this week is to talk to the Chinese and Russian and Japanese and

South Korean leadership about this problem of North Korea.

I was in Asia last week at the instruction of the President, in

Tokyo, in Seoul, in Beijing, trying to work with the five parties. We

also met the Russians in Beijing to firm up the alliance that we

have and to make sure we are all sending North Korea the same

strong message that it cannot be business as usual, especially after

the nuclear test.

We do see North Korea’s nuclear capability, combined with its

pursuit of weapons of mass destruction technology and ballistic

missiles, as a clear threat to international peace and security; and

it ought to be obvious to everyone concerned that the United States

has a special role to play in safeguarding security in the Asia Pacific

region. We seek a peaceful solution to the North Korea nuclear

problem.

We also realize the very real military threat that North Korea

poses to its neighbors, particularly our allied partners, Japan and

South Korea. So, in the wake of the October 9 test, the first thing

that President Bush did was to reaffirm publicly the security commitment

of the United States to Japan and South Korea that are

embodied in two treaties with the Japanese—one from 1960 with

the South Koreans, one from 1953—that commit us to the defense

of both of those allies.

President Bush also warrants that if North Korea transfers nuclear

weapons or material it will be considered to be a grave threat

to the security of the United States and we will hold North Korea

fully accountable for the consequences of such action. When Secretary

Rice was in the region just 3 weeks ago, she reaffirmed

these security commitments; and I can tell you they made an impact,

particularly in Japan.

As you know, there has been a debate in Japan about the constitution

of that country and about how it should act beyond the

borders of Japan; and we think that this alliance guarantee of the

United States means that Japan has no reason to build its own nuclear

weapons capability, which, of course, is reassuring for our policy

in the region and to all of its neighbors.

So there is a clear threat by the North Koreans militarily to all

of its neighbors, a clear threat from these nuclear tests as well as

from the ballistic missile tests of July.

The Chairman spoke in his opening statement about the position

of the United States in the Asia Pacific region, and he said that

he hoped that the United States would continue to be strong and

to lead in the region. We understand—and I think this is understood,

I am sure, by all Members of this Committee—that since

September 2, 1945, it has been the United States—that it has been

the guarantor of peace and security in Asia and in the Pacific region

that we must maintain a strong American military presence

in the region to guarantee the peace and security in Asia; and that

is certainly the ambition and the intention of the United States to

do that and to maintain the leading role that we play in that region.

I want to say a word about diplomacy. While we seek to impose

a significant, very tough sanctions regime on the North Koreans,

we also seek to keep the diplomatic door open to negotiations.

I think that most of you know that when my colleague and

friend, Chris Hill, was in Beijing on October 31, he did meet with

the North Koreans and Chinese in trilateral format. Then he met

with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan bilaterally,

and as a result of those discussions the North Koreans had

agreed to come back to the Six-Party Talks.

We hope to resume those talks before the end of 2006. I am deliberately

vague, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is not possible

to know at this point what the exact date of the resumption should

be. It depends on the seriousness of purpose that we believe the

North Koreans ought to bring to those talks. Because they can’t be

talks for talks’ sake. We need to make real progress in the next

round of negotiations.

And everything that North Korea says it needs is on the table.

If you go back to the September 19, 2005, joint statement of the

six parties and read it, it sets out a series of obligations that the

North Koreans have to meet and it sets out some commitments

that the United States and the other parties will meet as well.

Many of the Members in their opening statements talked about

some of those commitments.

I believe if you read it, if you go back and review it, you will see

that the United States did make commitments for, ultimately, a

normal relationship with the North Koreans should they fully

denuclearize, and that means their nuclear weapons program as

well as their civil nuclear power systems. North Korea needs to

demonstrate that it is serious this time about fulfilling these commitments.

Because in the wake of September 19, 2005, of course,

within 24 hours, it, in effect, walked away from those commitments.

It disavowed them. So the most important thing we need to

know is the seriousness of purpose that that country will bring to

the negotiations.

Some people are insisting that the United States should negotiate

with North Korea solely on a bilateral basis, but the North

Korean problem, especially its pursuit of nuclear weapons, is a regional

problem. It is not just a bilateral issue because this problem

poses a threat to all of its neighbors.

South Korea, a country that has a lot invested in, ultimately, a

peaceful relationship with the North, a country that, of course,

would be the greatest victim of North Korean militarism, South

Korea wants to be part of this process.

Japan, whose security is also imperiled by the missile tests and

the nuclear tests, wants to be part of the Six-Party Talks.

Russia has had a historic relationship with North Korea, has had

some entree into the government there, and has had a lot of experience

in the field of nuclear disarmament. Russia seeks a role, as

does China, North Korea’s leading trade partner and neighbor.

So we believe the best way to proceed is on this six-party basis.

North Korea, of course, is seeking to divide the five parties, especially

in its intent to negotiate directly with the United States. But

it can’t be the responsibility solely of the United States to make

sure that North Korea rolls back its nuclear programs, does a much

better job of meeting its international commitments on the human

rights front. It has got to be the work of all of us together. So that

is the way we proceeded.

Now from time to time, as you know, in 2005 and 2006, we have

met with the North Koreans bilaterally. Chris Hill, 2 weeks ago,

met with Kim Kye Gwan on a bilateral basis. In 2005, just before

we achieved the joint statement of September 2005, Chris Hill met

with the North Koreans bilaterally. So we haven’t said we refuse

to meet with them. We do from time to time, and there is discussion

that goes back and forth between our two governments.

But we have said that you need to seek a regional approach, and

we do count—and a number of the Members from both sides of the

aisle said this—on the commitment that China and Russia must

bring to these talks to use their influence with North Korea to

push them forward toward negotiations. And, of course, we count

on the support that Japan and South Korea, our two treaty allies,

would give this process.

Mr. Chairman, just two more brief points.

There is another issue that is related to the North Korea missile

and nuclear problem, and that is the issue of Iran. As you know,

we are engaged in the Security Council today trying to convince the

Russians and Chinese to move more quickly to meet their commitment

to us to pass a tough Security Council resolution against the

Iranian regime. These two issues are among the greatest security

challenges that we face, and they are linked. So what we do on

North Korea and the seriousness of purpose and the toughness

with which we approach it has to be a signal to the Iranians that

what the North Koreans have found in their nuclear adventure is

isolation, disapproval by the international community, now sanctions

under 1718. Iran will find the same fate if it continues, as its

President said yesterday, to accelerate its nuclear research toward

a significant enrichment capability at its plant in Natanz. We are

concerned about that, and we are focused on both of these problems,

and we do see the link between both of them.

I won’t cover any more points, Mr. Chairman. They are all in my

prepared testimony. But I would like to thank you for the invitation

for me to be with you today, and I am happy to respond to

your questions.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lantos, and distinguished Members

of the Committee for this timely opportunity to discuss U.S. policy toward North

Korea.

Mr. Chairman, let me first wish you the best in your retirement and express my

deep appreciation for your leadership of this important committee. As the last World

War II combat veteran from the Pacific theater serving in the U.S. House of Representatives,

you are taking with you into retirement a valuable and irreplaceable

perspective on our relations with East Asia. We all have benefited greatly from your

experience and wisdom. On behalf of all of my State Department colleagues, I wish

to thank you for your support for American diplomacy and for the American Foreign

Service.

Mr. Chairman, with its reckless July 5 missile launches and October 9 nuclear

test, the unpredictable North Korean government has reminded us again of the danger

its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and nuclear programs pose to U.S. national

security, to our allies, and to peace and security in Northeast Asia. The North

Korean government has broken its international commitments and threatened its

neighbors and the world.

Our response to North Korea’s objectionable behavior has been resolute. Together

with China, Japan, and Russia, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution

1718 on October 14, just five days after the nuclear test, imposing harsh sanctions

on the North Korean government. At the same time, we continue to seek a

diplomatic way forward to gain North Korea’s full adherence to the September 19,

2005 Joint Statement, which if implemented will lead to the complete, verifiable,

and irreversible dismantlement of that country’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear

programs.

We do not and will not recognize North Korea as a Nuclear Weapons State. We

thus seek as our most important objective the full dismantlement of all North Korea’s

nuclear weapons programs. We want North Korea to rejoin the NPT and return

to IAEA safeguards. We believe the best way to achieve these ends is for the

U.S. to continue to adhere to our dual-track strategy by:

1) implementing fully the UN sanctions to penalize and isolate the regime; and

2) keeping the door open to discussions and a return to the Six Party Talks.

We are pursuing these objectives with a clear purpose and considerable energy.

Just last week, I traveled to Japan, South Korea, and China with Under Secretary

Robert Joseph on the instructions of President Bush. We also met with senior Russian

diplomats in Beijing. Our aim was to coordinate a common position on both

the sanctions and the diplomacy with the four governments—our close partners in

the Six Party Talks. We were met with a very positive reception in each capital,

and a recognition of the need to work together to put maximum pressure on the Kim

Jong-Il regime.

This week, President Bush and Secretary Rice are in Hanoi for the APEC Summit

meetings. There, they will meet with leaders from across Asia to discuss what the

world community should do to bring North Korea to full implementation of its commitments

to all of us. Their goal will to be to reach agreement with our partners

on a way forward toward reviving and achieving success at the Six-Party Talks, and

to reaffirm with our partners our mutual commitment to fully and effectively implement

Resolution 1718.

Mr. Chairman, North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, coupled with

its pursuit of other WMD programs and ballistic missiles, is a clear threat to international

peace and security. The DPRK has also laundered money and distributed

counterfeit U.S. currency, and has engaged in illegal trafficking of narcotics, cigarettes,

and other goods. Overcoming the threat posed by North Korea is one of our

Government’s highest foreign policy priorities.

As we pursue our dual-track approach, we are also strengthening our strategic relationships

in Northeast Asia and reassuring our allies. While we seek a peaceful

solution to the North Korea nuclear problem, we also realize the very real military

threat posed by North Korea. Our policies remain anchored by our alliances with

key security partners Japan and South Korea. On the day of the nuclear test, President

Bush made a public address reaffirming the full range of the United States

deterrent and security commitments to Japan and South Korea, including the U.S.-

Japan Mutual Defense Treaty of 1960 and the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense

Treaty of 1953.

President Bush also warned that the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by

North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to

the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences

of such action. During her October trip to Asia, Secretary Rice reiterated

our security commitments while on the ground in Tokyo and Seoul. Our alliance

guarantee to Japan means that there is no reason for that nation to build its own

nuclear weapons capability—which is a welcome reassurance to China and other

Northeast Asian nations and serves to minimize regional tensions. To further support

Japan’s defense, we are also expanding missile defense cooperation with that

government, as we are doing with other partners.

As we continue our efforts to deal with this challenge, we look forward to support

and guidance from this Committee and the Congress.

North Korea’s July 5 missile launches, including its test of a long-range Taepo-

Dong 2, flouted international norms and violated a standing, self-imposed moratorium

on ballistic missile tests to which the North committed in 2000. The United

States, China and other countries immediately urged the DPRK to refrain from further

provocations, and the United Nations Security Council responded on July 15

by unanimously adopting Resolution 1695, which condemned North Korea’s actions.

Unfortunately, the North’s response to the international community was its October

3 threat to conduct a nuclear test. This threat flagrantly violated the commitments

it made over the years not to pursue nuclear weapons, including its signing

of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, an inter-Korean agreement on

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, the 1994 Agreed Framework with

the United States, and the September 19, 2005 Six Party Joint Statement. The

President, Secretary Rice, and our entire diplomatic team worked closely with Security

Council members and our key partners in the region to send an unambiguous

message to Pyongyang: Do not test. We also warned the North Koreans directly

through their UN Mission in New York. However, despite these clear warnings,

North Korea on October 9 detonated a nuclear device.

The international community’s response was again swift and clear. On October 14,

the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1718, a Chapter VII resolution

with binding obligations on all UN Member States. This unprecedented resolution—

made possible by strong leadership from the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia—

condemned the nuclear test and requires Member States to implement specific sanctions

related to the DPRK’s nuclear, WMD, and missile programs.

The G8, ASEAN, the EU, and many other international groups, as well as numerous

individual nations, have also spoken out to condemn the North Korean nuclear

test and ballistic missile launches.

EAST ASIA: A VITAL REGION WITH IMPORTANT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

Mr. Chairman, North Korea’s self-isolating behavior, which has contributed to the

country’s poverty, stands in dramatic contrast to the impressive, positive trends in

East Asia, one of the most prosperous and successful regions in the world today.

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The East Asia-Pacific region accounts for nearly a third of the earth’s population,

a quarter of global GDP, a disproportionate share of global growth, and a quarter

of U.S. exports, including about 37 percent of our agricultural exports. In all, there

is some $810 billion in two-way trade with the United States. In every regard—geopolitically,

militarily, diplomatically, economically, and commercially—East Asia is

vital to the national security interests of the United States.

Today, the East Asia-Pacific area is largely at peace and the future for the region

looks brighter than the past. The region has not seen a major military conflict in

more than 25 years, and there has been widespread rejection of terrorism. Yet there

is a glaring exception to this sea of good news. The Korean Peninsula unfortunately

remains divided more than 50 years after the Korean War. There is a truce, an armistice

line, but not a peace. North Korea still amasses its forces along the demilitarized

zone and does not formally recognize the existence of South Korea. North

Korea’s bellicose government routinely threatens conflict with our ally, the Republic

of Korea, and has troubled relations with all its neighbors.

The US has played a leading role to help stabilize Northeast Asia since the end

of World War II and will continue to do so. We are committed to maintaining the

60-year period of relative peace and security, made possible in large measure by the

presence of U.S. military forces in the region. We seek to maintain that peace by

working with other countries to isolate North Korea. At the same time, our greatest

ambition remains achieving the lofty but reachable goals outlined in the September

2005 Joint Statement, including the full denuclearization of and a permanent peace

settlement on the Korean peninsula, normalized, peaceful relations between North

Korea and its neighbors and between North Korea and the United States, and new

opportunities for the people of North Korea to build better lives.

DUAL-TRACK STRATEGY

Mr. Chairman, as I said at the outset, we have a clear strategy for dealing with

North Korea. This is a dual track approach comprised specifically of (1) sanctions

aimed at penalizing and isolating the North while pressuring them to pursue diplomacy,

and a (2) diplomatic track aimed at a negotiating North Korea’s

denuclearization. The sanctions also protect the U.S. and our allies from North Korea’s

nuclear, WMD, and missile threats, including its proliferation of nuclear,

WMD, and missile technologies.

DIPLOMACY

We are pursuing a diplomatic solution through the resumption of the Six-Party

Talks. This process was energized with the breakthrough Assistant Secretary Chris

Hill achieved in Beijing on October 31, when, in meetings with his Chinese and

North Korean counterparts, the North agreed to return to the Six Party Talks, and

renewed its commitment to the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and to the

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Let me stress that the world will not accept merely the resumption of the Talks

for talks’ sake. We need to make real progress in the next round. Everything that

North Korea seeks is on the table. Our goal is straightforward and spelled out clearly

in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement: a denuclearized Korean Peninsula,

which includes North Korea’s complete and verifiable dismantling of its nuclear programs

and its return as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and

IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. Equally important, the Joint

Statement envisions a better life for the people of North Korea through economic

and energy assistance; greater integration into the prosperous region around it;

fuller participation in the international community; a path toward diplomatic recognition;

and a road map toward a full peace treaty to end the Korean War.

Regrettably, within 24 hours of its signing of the Joint Statement, the DPRK

chose to reinterpret the agreement radically and unilaterally. We welcome the

North’s renewal of its commitment to the Joint Statement which was made during

Assistant Secretary Hill’s October 31 meetings in Beijing. But North Korea will

need to demonstrate that it is serious this time about fulfilling its commitments. We

believe that full implementation of the Joint Statement remains the best path for

a better future for North Korea and its people. In Assistant Secretary Hill’s October

31 meetings, we also assured the North Koreans that within a resumed Six-Party

process, we would be willing to form a working group to discuss and address financial

issues, including the Banco Delta Asia case.

Some insist that the U.S. should negotiate with North Korea solely on a bilateral

basis, but the North Korean problem—especially its pursuit of nuclear weapons—

is not just a U.S.-North Korea bilateral issue. Rather, North Korea’s nuclear weapons

pose a regional threat to all its neighbors. South Korea must be part of the solu24

tion, as must Japan, China and Russia. That is why we are addressing this issue

in the Six-Party framework, with all the regional stakeholders that have the most

leverage on North Korea afforded a place at the table. As host of the Six-Party

Talks, China played a central role in the success of last September—the unanimous

adoption of the Six-Party Joint Statement. As a neighbor of North Korea, Japan has

important security and bilateral interests at stake, including the abductee issue.

Tokyo played the lead role in drafting UN Resolution 1695 in response to the July

5 missile launches, and continues to lead in the multilateral diplomatic track. South

Korea has unique considerations and an interest in a comprehensive resolution of

the DPRK nuclear issue, and its security is threatened most directly by North Korea’s

militarism. Finally, Russia, with its historical ties to North Korea and long experience

with disarmament, is a critical partner in the Six Party process. Secretary

Rice and I have consulted closely with Moscow throughout this crisis.

North Korea seeks to divide the five parties and desires, especially, to negotiate

directly with the U.S. It should not be the responsibility of the United States alone

to achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. It is rather in our clear interest

to have China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia pulling on the same oar with

the U.S.

The unprecedented level of cooperation that has emerged among Northeast Asian

countries on this issue would not have been possible had we adopted a bilateral approach.

That said, the United States has held bilateral discussions with North

Korea within the Six Party talks since 2002 and we would have every expectation

to continue to do so in the future.

SANCTIONS

Concurrent with the diplomatic track, we are working to fully and effectively enforce

the sanctions against North Korea in UNSC Resolution 1718, and to get our

international partners to do the same.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 is binding on all UN Member

States. 1718 condemned the nuclear test and expressed the Council’s grave concern

that the test posed a danger to peace and stability in the region. The Security Council

demanded that North Korea refrain from conducting any additional nuclear or

missile tests, retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and return to

NPT and IAEA safeguards, and suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile

program. It also decided that North Korea must abandon all of its nuclear weapons

and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.

UNSCR 1718 required Member States to prevent the direct or indirect supply,

sale or transfer to the DPRK of a specified list of conventional weapons, and items,

material, equipment, goods and technology, which could contribute to the DPRK’s

nuclear, ballistic missile, or other WMD-related programs. UNSCR 1718 additionally

banned the transfer of luxury goods to North Korea.

The United States has taken steps to implement Resolution 1718 expeditiously.

Many were already U.S. policy. The United States has a total prohibition on the export

to North Korea of any items that could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear,

missile, biological and chemical programs. This includes all of the items designated

by the 1718 Sanctions Committee. In addition, we have previously acted under Executive

Order 13382 to designate twelve entities and one individual as being engaged

in proliferation activities related to North Korea. Under E.O. 13382, the

United States has frozen the funds, assets and economic resources of these entities

and individuals. We have also proposed that the 1718 Sanctions Committee designate

these entities and individual, under the provisions of the Resolution.

Further, we have defined a list of luxury goods banned for transfer to North

Korea. The U.S. currently sends very few, if any, of these goods to the DPRK, but

these new regulations will ensure that we are in full compliance with Resolution

1718.

In pressing all UN Member States to fully and effectively implement Resolution

1718, our intent is not just to sanction for sanction’s sake. North Korea needs to

be punished and isolated for its reckless actions that threaten peace and security.

At the same time, we want to convince the North Koreans to pursue the diplomatic

path and agree to denuclearize. China, North Korea’s largest trading partner and

main conduit to the outside world, has committed to enforce 1718. As China follows

through, the North Korean regime will feel the pain. It will be deprived of hard currency

it earns from exporting WMD and missile technology and conventional arms.

And the North Korean elite will lose access to prized luxury goods. We are hopeful

this pressure will convince the North to do the right thing. But should the North

not take advantage of the opportunity to resume and achieve progress at the Six

Party Talks, the sanctions will continue to protect the U.S. and our international

partners by limiting the advancement of the North’s nuclear, WMD, and missile programs,

and by preventing the North from proliferating nuclear, WMD, and missile

technologies to other regimes and to non-state actors.

In addition to pressing for full and effective implementation of Resolutions 1718,

we are making great efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. First,

through initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, countries

work together to stop illicit shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related

materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea, to and from states and non-state

actors of proliferation concern. Eighty states already participate in PSI, and we are

urging all Member States to endorse the Statement of Interdiction Principles and

participate in PSI activities. Second, we are bringing India into the non-proliferation

regime, with a pioneering agreement that gives the IAEA access to India’s civil nuclear

facilities and gives India access to civilian nuclear power. We are grateful for

the support this Committee and the entire House of Representatives gave to this

effort. Third, we are rallying the world behind a UN Security Council Resolution

that requires all countries to criminalize proliferation activities. Along with Russia,

we have launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

OUR ALLIES IN ASIA

What we found in the region last week was a unanimous recognition that North

Korea’s nuclear test is a ‘‘game changer,’’ that this is not a time for business as

usual. This is why the Japanese have imposed their own unilateral sanctions, including

barring North Korean imports. This is why the South Koreans have promised

to become more actively involved in PSI and have suspended aid to the North

and frozen expansion of their joint North-South economic projects. This is why the

Chinese took the unprecedented step of supporting Security Council resolutions

1695 and 1718. All our partners are committed to implementing Resolution 1718

and to the effort to reach a diplomatic agreement with the North on

denuclearization.

IRAN

How the world responds to North Korea is likely to affect the calculations of other

aspiring nuclear powers, including Iran. Through our firm multilateral diplomacy

confronting the North Korean threat, we are also sending a strong message to Iran:

The path North Korea is choosing is not leading to more prosperity and security—

it is, in fact, leading in the opposite direction. Iran should heed this message, and

meet the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1696 by fully and

verifiably suspending its enrichment and reprocessing activities. If Iran chooses this

correct path, rather that facing punitive measures like North Korea, Iran could get

a wide range of economic, political, and technological benefits, as promised in the

P5+1 incentive package, and the U.S. will engage in direct talks with Iran.

The permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to

stop these two countries—North Korea and Iran—from advancing their nuclear

weapons programs. If we can succeed, the world will be a measurably safer place.

If we cannot, we will face a critical challenge to our basic security. This must be

one of our nation’s top foreign policy objectives—to stop Iran and North Korea.

NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS

Our concerns about the behavior of the DPRK extend well beyond

denuclearization. The regime subjects its citizens to rigid controls over many aspects

of their lives and maintains an extensive prison camp system, with reports of prisoners’

involuntary labor, torture, forced abortions, starvation, and execution. Citizens

are denied basic human rights such as freedom of expression, religion, movement,

assembly, and association. The government attempts to control all information;

there is no freedom of the press. Since 2001, the U.S. has designated North

Korea as a country of particular concern for violations of religious freedom. The U.S.

has made clear to North Korea that discussion of its human rights record will be

part of any future normalization process.

The DPRK’s behavior towards its citizens, including its human rights failings,

have led to a stream of refugees. The United States is extremely concerned about

the plight of North Korean refugees. As you are aware, President Bush was the first

world leader to invite some of these refugees into the Oval Office. We are deeply

troubled by reports of the involuntary return of North Koreans from China to the

DPRK, as these returnees may face serious abuses, including torture and execution

in some cases. The U.S. regularly discusses its strong concerns with China and

other governments, as well as with the highest levels of the Office of the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and concerned non-governmental and private

groups. The U.S. values the role of organizations dedicated to promoting the human

rights of North Koreans. The U.S. also has great sympathy for the Japanese families

of those innocent people abducted by the North Korean regime.

The Administration appreciates Congress’ support for our efforts in this area, and

is successfully implementing the 2004 North Korean Human Rights Act. We will

continue to closely consult with Congress on this important issue.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

We are watching carefully as we implement UNSCR 1695 and 1718 that the humanitarian

situation does not worsen for the North Korea people. The President has

made clear that passage of UNSCR 1718 is not intended to make humanitarian

work more difficult to conduct.

The United States continues to support the efforts of the World Food Program to

provide assistance to the DPRK’s most vulnerable populations. Since 1995, when the

magnitude of the crisis in North Korea was first identified, the United States has

generously supported WFP’s activities in that country, providing over 2 million tons

of food assistance, valued at over $700 million.

We will base any decision on whether to contribute food to WFP’s new Protracted

Relief and Recovery Operation for North Korea, as always, on assessed needs, competing

needs elsewhere, and the ability to monitor the distribution of that assistance,

to assure that our food gets to its intended recipients.

Our objective in providing food aid to North Korea has been and will continue to

be to help relieve the suffering of the North Korean people, despite our concerns

about the North Korean government’s policies.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in my consultations with Japanese, South Korean, Chinese, and

Russian officials last week, it was clear that our Six-Party partners share our grave

concerns about the North Korea nuclear problem and our commitment to a dualtrack

approach. They agree on the need to send a strong international message to

Pyongyang that there are consequences to its irresponsible actions, and that measures

such as UNSCR 1718 will remain in force until North Korea meets all of the

requirements of this important resolution. In Hanoi this week, President Bush and

Secretary Rice will reaffirm our policy and firm resolve with the leaders of APEC

nations.

Working closely with the international community and our Six-Party partners, the

United States will continue to press on all diplomatic fronts and will use all policy

tools and legal authorities at its disposal, consistent with international law and the

mandates of the Security Council, to achieve the complete denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula.

Our message to Pyongyang remains clear: abandon nuclear weapons, move to implement

the Joint Statement, and join your neighbors as a responsible member of

the international community and the prosperous region of Northeast Asia.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith, thank you very much. I just want to laud

your leadership on this issue of human rights worldwide. You have

been a great friend to the efforts that many Administrations have

made to promote human rights in the world, and you are right to

single out North Korea.

We are very concerned and we are never going to forget or stop

talking about the grave human rights problems in North Korea,

and you have mentioned some of them: The imprisonment of people

because of their political views, the famines, the multiple famines

that have taken place in that country over the last 15 years, the

fact that there have been so many refugees that have had to make

their way out of that country, some to China, some to the shores

of the United States, and we try to bring in as many as we can

because of the totalitarian nature of that society, of that government

imposed on North Korean society.

The President has appointed Ambassador Jay Lefkowitz to be his

envoy for human rights matters, and he is very actively working

in concert with Ambassador Chris Hill to promote this issue, to

talk about it and to shed light on it. I can assure you that we will

not forget this issue, and we will continue to push it forward, both

directly with the North Koreans as well as with the Chinese Gov28

ernment, because there are so many refugees on Chinese soil. We

have taken the position that none of them should be sent back, of

course, to North Korea if they make their way to China. It is a very

serious issue, and thank you for pointing it out, and I can assure

you of our good faith in putting this issue forward.

Mr. Crowley, thank you.

Our goals in returning to the Six-Party Talks are very clear. We

want to see the full and complete denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula; and we want the North Koreans to go back to the September

19, 2005, agreement—they signed up to it—and to fulfill it.

Now that agreement has mutual commitments, many by North

Korea, to dismantle their nuclear weapons, their nuclear energy

programs, to not threaten their neighbors to rejoin the NPT, to invite

back in the IAEA inspectors.

It also entails responsibilities, commitments on the side of the

United States and the other parties. We are willing to fulfill the

commitments we made, and they are vast, and going back to read

that document lets you know what an important process this is.

But we need to see that North Korea is serious about it.

Unfortunately, their track record is abysmal.

If you look back to the agreed framework of 1994 and

negotiated by the Clinton Administration, the North Koreans violated

that agreement in spades, and they essentially rhetorically

walked away from the September 19 agreement within 24 hours,

and so we need to verify that they actually are going to implement

that agreement.

We haven’t closed the door to diplomacy. So we have this dualtrack

policy of enforcing the sanctions resolution of October 14,

Resolution 1718, which in relative UN terms is a very tough resolution,

and we led the fight for that and, at the same time, to keep

the door open to the negotiations.

That is why we agreed to have Ambassador Hill return to Beijing

on October 31, meet with the North Koreans and Chinese and then

meet, as I said, bilaterally with the North Koreans to get a sense

if they were serious this time. They say they are. We will test that

proposition when we return to the talks at some point before the

end of the year.

And we do require—in addition to direct engagement with North

Korea, which we have from time to time, we do require the assistance

of other countries. China has influence as a neighbor and a

leading trading partner with North Korea. The Russians and the

South Koreans do as well.

Japan has a great interest in this. Japan, of course, has been a

victim of these missile tests both in the late 1990s and again in

July. Japan has had to suffer through the abduction issue since the

1970s, and we have great sympathy with the Japanese people and

Government for that.

So it does take all of these countries together to send the right

signals to the North Koreans; and we want to see the complete and

verifiable dismantlement of all of their nuclear programs, full implementation

of that September 2005 agreement. I don’t know if it

is possible to go back to the talks just for talks’ sake and to think

we made any progress. We wouldn’t have made progress. So we

want to see demonstrable progress in that first round of talks.

I think it has been a diplomatic success of this Administration

to achieve the September 2005 agreement, and now to

convince the North Koreans that the only way forward for them is

negotiation, and that is a return of the Six-Party Talks, it is a tactical

success. It is not a complete strategic success, because we

haven’t actually convinced them yet to fulfill the terms of that

agreement, and to do that in a verifiable way. So that is the test

that is ahead of us in 2006 and 2007.

But, you know, you don’t want to leave yourself with only one option

when it comes to North Korea, you do want to leave a diplomatic

door open, and that is what we have done, but in a way that

protects the interests of our country. At the same time as we negotiate,

we have got the sanctions regime; we are, of course, talking

about missile defense with our ally, Japan; we have a very tough

counter proliferation regime in place in East Asia, all designed to

make sure that North Korea doesn’t proliferate.

It has been a serial proliferator, unfortunately, in its most recent

history over the last 15 years or so. And the resolution does give

member states, including the U.S., the right to inspect ships, and,

of course, under the Proliferation Security Initiative, we think also

on a limited basis, if necessary, we have the right to interdict shipping

as well, we, the United States, and some of our allies. And so

we have to pay attention to those measures as well as the diplomatic

process.

Mr. Rohrabacher, we are mindful of the fact that

North Korea is a totalitarian government, and the government has

imposed extraordinary prohibitions on freedom of discussion, openness—

or freedom of information going into the country.

Well, we certainly have made use of Voice of America

and of other radio and TV——

I will try to complete my answer.

We have certainly tried, as best we can, to get basic information

to the North Korean people about the nature of their own govern31

ment and about the reality of the conditions under which they

live——

And the problem that we face, Mr. Rohrabacher, as

you know, is that this is the most closed society on earth. There

are no American Government officials there, we don’t have formal

diplomatic relations, and we don’t have a consulate or Embassy in

place. So we are very limited in what we can do, but we are interested

in the objective that you are interested in, I can assure you.

I actually think that if implemented fully and effectively,

this particular resolution, 1718, the one passed on October

14th, can be useful in building pressure on the North Korean regime,

because if you look at the terms of that resolution and read

through it, it deprives them of the normal type of investment,

intercourse trade, in ballistic missile technology in a nuclear

sphere, in other aspects of its commercial development that a normal

state would have. And so if we can convince the Chinese Government,

the Russian Government and the other East Asian states

to implement this fully and effectively, we think this can be useful.

I would also agree with you that the action we took in designating

Banco Delta Asia got the attention of the North Korean regime

because it hit at the heart of what that regime does prize, and

that is money, to run its military——

That was a unilateral U.S. Government action under

the PATRIOT Act.

Well, you know, I would like to just say a word in

defense of that resolution, because it is not going to be possible for

the United States alone, through unilateral action—and we have

pursued unilateral action, we have been right to do so in terms of

the Executive Orders available to the President in designating individuals

and entities that are involved in their WMD program; we

have done that, we have designated 12 entities and one individual.

And we have, as you know, sanctioned Banco Delta Asia. That is

important.

But if you are looking for a way to, in essence, try to cut off all

normal trade and investment that they could use to fuel their

WMD and missile programs and their nuclear programs, you have

to have other countries involved; and the way we have done that

is through the UN Security Council.

I would just like to say in the first part of your question,

Congressman Rohrabacher, I am just looking through the resolution

now. This is a tough resolution, and the test of a resolution

like this will be its implementation. And when I was out with

Under Secretary Bob Joseph in Asia last week, we spent a lot of

time talking to the Russians, Chinese, and South Koreans especially,

about full implementation.

I think that multilateral action can be successful, I

just want to address this point.

And I will address the last point, too.

I think it is important that we acknowledge, whether it is on

Iran or North Korea, we cannot be successful alone, we do need the

cooperation of other countries, and that is where a lot of our focus

of our diplomacy is.

On the humanitarian issue——

There have been times during the Clinton Administration

as well as during this Administration that we have supported

the World Food Programme, food donations to the North Korean

people, we have done that purely for humanitarian reasons,

and that was the right thing to do. The people of North Korea, as

you suggested in your first question, are the victims of this regime

in Pyongyang. And we don’t want to subsidize the North Korean’s

ability to build a nuclear weapon system, we don’t think we have

done that, but when there is evidence of famine and massive food

shortages, we believe we have a humanitarian imperative to help

deliver food aid——

To help deliver food aid to the people of North Korea.

Mr. Fortenberry, what I said in my testimony and

in my opening statement is that we are pursuing a dual-track

strategy. The first part of that strategy is to isolate the pressure

of the North Korea Government through sanctions, our own United

States sanctions—which have been in place for decades—and UN

Security Council multilateral sanctions, which we believe are absolutely

necessary to have an impact. If the United States just acted

alone toward North Korea, we wouldn’t have the type of impact

that we need. And you are right to suggest that China is a big part

of this.

And that gets to the second part of your strategy, which is diplomatic.

The Chinese have a major role to play here, they are the

leading trade partner, they are the country probably with the

greater political influence in Pyongyang on the Kim Jong-il regime,

and we have consistently asked the Chinese to use that influence.

After the nuclear test of October 9th, the Chinese acted very

quickly with us in New York to pass that Security Council resolution.

There was obviously a great deal of frustration in Beijing toward

the North Korean regime, and I would say, based on my conversations

last week in Beijing, even a little bit of anger, which

was totally justified. We would like to see the Chinese Government

continue to have a tougher attitude toward North Korea, and we

would like to have the Chinese Government use its influence to

produce the type of agreement that we want. And it is very simple,

the North Koreans have committed to dismantle their nuclear

weapons programs and their entire nuclear industry, but they

haven’t done it.

So in pursuing diplomacy, we are not pursuing talks for talks’

sakes, we are not going to agree to endless rounds of talks that

don’t produce results. And so we are carefully trying to prepare the

ground for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, maybe in the

month of December, so that we get some action out of the North

Koreans. And China is key to that, and I think you are right to

suggest that.

Well, I think that there is no question that North

Korea is now the major issue in the United States-Chinese relationship

concerning foreign policy and security policy, particularly

in East Asia. I know it will be on the agenda when President Bush

sits down with President Jong-il in a few days in Hanoi at the

APEC summit, it will certainly be on the agenda when Secretary

Rice meets Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung in Hanoi on Friday of

this week. The Chinese know that.

In fact, the President sent Under Secretary Joseph and I to

China last week, expressly for the purpose of spending 2 full days

there, I think a total of 13 or 14 hours of discussion on this North

Korean issue, and we made it abundantly clear, I certainly did,

with my talks with Foreign Minister Lee and other Chinese officials

that this issue is front and center in the United States-China

relationship.

There is nothing more important in terms of America’s security

in East Asia than stopping the North Korean nuclear program and

removing that threat from Japan and South Korea, our two treaty

allies in that particular part of Northeast Asia. And so we take it

very seriously. A major objective of ours.

Congressman Delahunt, I am aware of the report,

but I have not read it in full, so I don’t want to——

I don’t know the authors of the report.

Mr. Delahunt, I am aware of the fact of this report,

but I have not read it; so I think I should withhold judgment on

it until I can read it.

Mr. Delahunt, there is no question that the Chinese

Government has communicated with the United States its outright

opposition to the fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons and

that they have conducted a nuclear test. And I understand Chinese

policy to be that they would like to see a full dismantlement of

North Korea’s nuclear industry as well as its nuclear complex, because

China is a neighbor and does not wish to live next door to

a nuclear-armed North Korea. That is how I understand Chinese

policy, that is how they expressed it to me. And I am not aware,

personally, of any effort by the Chinese Government to assist the

North Korean nuclear program.

I would just say, Congressman Delahunt, that what

unites the five parties in these talks is our agreement that we are

not going to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, we

are going to look for a complete dismantlement, and we are going

to use our combined influence to achieve that under the terms of

this agreement that was negotiated 14 months ago, the September

19, 2005, agreement. And in my 2 days of discussions in Beijing

last week, the Chinese Government did exhibit a great determination

to see that agreement fulfilled now. And that is the rationale

for leaving the diplomatic door open to the resumption of these Six-

Party Talks, which we deliberately have done. And in fact we have

announced we are going to go back to the talks.

What we need to do in the next few weeks is to work with the

Chinese, the Russians, the Japanese, the South Koreans, and all

send a common message to North Korea, when the North Koreans

show up at the talks, they have got to deliver this time, and they

have got to implement this agreement from September 2005. That

is very important, and that is the crux of our diplomacy over the

next few weeks.

Thank you, Congressman Leach, for those very

thoughtful questions. Let me just make three comments in response,

if I could.

The first is to share your assessment of my good friend Chris

Hill, who is one of our finest diplomats, and we are very fortunate

to have him. And he is the point person for the North Korea talks,

as well as our assistant secretary the entire region.

Second, on food assistance. In my response to Congressman

Rohrabacher, I was simply trying to suggest that there are times

when the United States has to meet a moral imperative and a humanitarian

imperative, and we can’t allow the North Korean Government

to victimize its own population so much that we turn

away from extending food assistance during a famine.

And so I think both of the last two Administrations, the Administrations

of President Bush and President Clinton, have elected

from time to time to extend food aid, normally through the World

Food Programme, which is a highly efficient and effective UN organization.

We haven’t given food aid since 2005. We have had some

real concerns about our ability to effectively monitor how the aid

is distributed. We don’t want the North Korean Government or

military to steal the aid or steal the food, we want it to go to people

who are truly affected, but I certainly didn’t want to close off the

possibility that we might choose to—the President might choose to

resume aid, should there be that humanitarian imperative. That

was the point I was trying to make.

Secondly, I think you have asked very good questions and made

good comments about the difficulty of deciding how you move forward

diplomatically. And I would say this; I think we are pursuing

a number of channels here. We have the Six-Party Talks. And what

I meant to say in my opening remarks was there has been criticism

of our Administration for pursuing the Six-Party Talk format, and

I was trying to answer that criticism. It just seems logical that

China, Russia, Japan and South Korea have as much interest as

we do, in closer proximity to North Korea, to stop a nuclear program.

We want to build on that strength in a multilateral format.

That is why we have chosen the Six-Party format.

We have not denied the possibility of direct contacts; in fact,

there was a direct face-to-face bilateral discussion/negotiation 2

weeks ago by Chris Hill and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in

Beijing. In 2005, I think it was July 2005, there was a similar

meeting.

So from time to time, we have elected to deal with the north bilaterally.

The North Koreans have a mission in New York at the

United Nations, and from time to time, we speak to them directly

from the State Department, from other offices of the Executive

Branch directly to the North Koreans. So we have not disavowed

direct contacts, but we are putting the emphasis on the Six-Party

format because we believe that has the best chance to be effective

and to bring the result that we want, which is dismantlement of

the nuclear programs and denuclearization of the Peninsula.

I would also say just to conclude my response, the North Koreans

have effectively isolated themselves here. Had they chosen to implement

the September 2005 agreement, as opposed to disavowing

it within 24 hours, then I think it is logical to assume that over

the last 14 months we would have had a variety of engagements

with them. And if you look at the September 19th agreement, it

does talk eventually about fully normal relations, but that is the

end of the process, once they have affected a denuclearization. And

I think it is an interesting point of comparison with Vietnam, but

a very different situation.

We normalized in August 1995 because the major issues that

separated us had been resolved, and there had been a lot of active

Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in particular. We

haven’t seen that in North Korea. The major issue of nuclear weapons

is unresolved. The other issue of human rights is out there, too.

So we have a lot of business that needs to be transacted with the

North Koreans and a lot of impediments to overcome before we can

have that type of relationship, a lot of business indeed.

Congressman Sherman, I would argue that there has

been a reaction from China, which has been, from our point of

view, positive, particularly after the missile test of July 4 and 5,

and most especially after October 9——

In our discussions with the Chinese over the

month—it has been just over a month since the nuclear test—the

Chinese have exhibited, as I said to other Members, real frustration

and, indeed, anger at what the North Koreans have done. But

more importantly, they were a leading partner in the effort to craft

and then pass in the Security Council Resolution 1718 5 days after

the nuclear test. And that was important because we have seen, for

instance, on the Iran UN Security Council resolution, what happens

when countries want to slow down the process, and that is exactly

what is happening now in New York.

In the case of North Korea, the process was facilitated by China,

and we considered China to be a lead partner, along with Japan,

in the negotiations over that resolution. So we were impressed by

that.

Now, there are two other ways that China can be helpful. The

first is in implementing 1718. And what the Chinese told us last

week in Beijing is that they will implement that resolution by the

letter of the resolution, and we respect that and we expect that to

happen.

Secondly, the diplomacy ahead is going to be very challenging.

We are not interested in going back to the talks just to talk and

have no result. There is a specific outcome that all the five parties

have agreed on, and that North Korea says it has agreed to, and

that is, they will finally implement this agreement from September

2005. And so China is going to be important.

Now, it is my judgment—this gets to the heart of your question,

I think, Congressman Sherman—it is our judgment that China has

influence, perhaps more influence than any other country, on North

Korea. But I think it is at least worth debating whether China has

ultimate influence. The Chinese will tell you they don’t, and that

they have some influence, but not influence to dictate the behavior

of the North Korean regime. I think that stands to reason. China

doesn’t want to see a nuclear-armed North Korea, but a nuclear armed

North Korea has emerged.

So the challenge to our diplomacy is to affect a better working

relationship with China and to have North Korea and the resolution

of the problem be a point of common ground. In the recent discussions

we have had, there are many indications that the Chinese

see this in the same fashion, therefore, we wouldn’t agree that

somehow we would link China’s behavior on this issue with other

aspects of our bilateral relationship, however challenging they

are—and we are concerned about some of the same issues that you

are—because we do think that China is heading in the right direction

with North Korea and has been a good partner, especially over

these last months, since the missile and nuclear tests over the last

6 months.

Yes, I do, Congressman Leach. And it is in my prepared

testimony, but I will deal with it briefly.

When Ambassador Hill met with Ambassador Pak Gil-yon on October

31, they agreed that we would form a working group on financial

measures within the format of the Six-Party Talks, and

that some of the outstanding issues—and we have a lot of them—

pertaining to North Korea’s behavior would be addressed in that

working group. There is the issue of the activities of the money

laundering by the North Koreans through Banco Delta Asia, there

is the illegal North Korean counterfeiting of the American dollar.

And as you know, there are legal processes underway in our Government

to address some of those issues. And so we felt that this

was a proper way to bring this issue forward with the North Koreans.

Now, it was my understanding from Ambassador Hill that the

North Koreans did not make this a condition of a resumption of the

Six-Party Talks, but it was clearly an issue of concern to them. It

is an issue of concern to us. And the easiest way to resolve this is

for the North Koreans to stop money laundering in the North

Korea Government, and stop counterfeiting American currency.